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Abstract 
The morality of abortion is one of the most hotly debated topics in 
contemporary ethics. Two of the most influential arguments in favour 
of the permissibility of abortion were put forward in the latter half of 
the twentieth century by Warren (1973) and Thomson (1971). The 
implications of these arguments, however, for unwilling putative 
fathers have largely not been considered. Some writers, for example 
Brake (2005), have argued that Thomson’s defence of abortion might 
allow a putative father under certain circumstances to terminate his 
parental responsibilities and rights. As far as I am aware, nobody has 
considered the implications of Warren’s argument for unwilling 
putative fathers. In this paper I will consider the implications of both 
arguments to putative unwilling fathers. I will argue that if Thomson’s 
and Warren’s arguments are successful defences of abortion then they 
are also successful in justifying a male counterpart to abortion which I 
label ‘elective abandonment’. I will not be defending or refuting 
Thomson’s and Warren’s arguments for abortion but am simply 
defending the claim that they apply as well to elective abandonment as 
they do to abortion.       
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1. Introduction 
Two of the most influential arguments in favour of the 
permissibility of abortion were put forward by Thomson (1971) and 
Warren (1973). In this paper I will consider the implications of both 
arguments for men. I will argue that if Thomson’s and Warren’s 
arguments are successful defences of abortion then they are also 
successful at justifying a male counterpart to abortion which I label 
‘elective abandonment’. I will neither be defending nor attacking 
abortion, instead I will be applying the arguments for abortion to 
elective abandonment.1 As a result, the claim is conditional in form; if 
abortion is permissible then so is a male counterpart.  
I shall do two novel things in this paper. First, when discussing 
Thomson’s paper, after identifying the basic principles behind her 
violinist thought experiment and applying them to men, 2 I shall then 
use these principles to create my own unique thought experiment 
designed to exemplify these same principles but in a scenario very 
similar to that in which some unwilling fathers find themselves. 
Second, my application of Warren’s argument to unwilling fathers is 
also entirely new.   
                                                          
1 This will be similar to the ideas expressed about acquiring and renouncing paternal 
responsibility put forward in Brake (2005) and McCulley (1988).     
2 When Brake discusses Thomson’s argument, she largely focuses on Thomson’s thought 
experiments involving ‘people seeds’ and the principles involved therein. 
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2. Elective Abandonment 
As Sheldon points out “There seems to be broad agreement in much 
of the western industrialised world that men who father children out of 
marriage share an obligation to support them financially.” (Sheldon, 2003, 
p. 176). This agreement is frequently supported and enforced by law (The 
Child Support Act 1991). M. G. McCulley has highlighted that as a result of 
this after conception, “He [the father] must rely on the decisions of the 
female to determine his future. The putative father does not have the luxury, 
after the fact of conception, to decide that he is not ready for fatherhood. 
Unlike the female, he has no escape route” (McCully, 1988, p. 4). As a 
result, there seems to be a discrepancy in freedom.  
Elective abandonment would involve men morally ‘opting out’ 
of all parental responsibilities and rights. After they have exercised 
elective abandonment they would permanently sever all parental 
responsibilities and lose all parental rights. Elective abandonment is 
analogous to abortion in that it is defended using the same arguments 
and, as we shall see, is in some sense interested in preserving the same 
freedoms. It is not necessarily analogous to abortion in any other way, 
for example its consequences or the process by which it is carried out.  
Some potential critics of elective abandonment may think that 
there is no male counterpart to abortion and no need for one. They 
might say that if a man does not want to be a father then he should 
simply avoid having sexual intercourse. However, this can equally be 
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said of a woman seeking abortion (except for cases of rape). If a 
woman doesn’t want to become pregnant and then become a mother, 
then she should simply avoid having sexual intercourse. As a result, 
this line of argument won’t work if we think that abortion is 
permissible. Instead if the critic wants to argue that abortion is morally 
permissible but elective abandonment is not then they will need to 
show that the arguments used to justify abortion do not apply to 
elective abandonment and/or that there is a morally relevant difference 
between them. I aim to show that the arguments used to justify 
abortion do apply to elective abandonment and that there is no morally 
relevant difference between them. As a result, simply saying that a 
man should avoid having sexual intercourse if he does not want to 
become a father is insufficient as an argument.   
  I suggest two conditions that must be fulfilled before elective 
abandonment can be exercised. The first is that elective abandonment 
must be exercised before the foetus gets to a certain age (the same age 
that marks the permissibility of abortions). The second is they must 
notify the mother in advance, although she would not be able to 
overrule this decision. The first condition is necessary for two reasons. 
The first and most significant reason is because, as we shall see, 
Warren’s defence of abortion potentially only applies to abortions 
before a certain date and thus if it is to apply to men it can only work 
before a certain date. The second is because I am trying to 
conceptualise as close a male equivalent to abortion as possible. 
Therefore, if, as Warren thinks, abortion is morally impermissible after 
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a certain time period then parity would demand that elective 
abandonment is also impermissible after that date. The reason for the 
second condition is that it does not seem unreasonable to say that when 
your decisions will affect the life of another, even if the decision itself 
is entirely your own and at your discretion, you still owe it to them to 
inform them in a timely manner of the decision you intend to make. 
Becoming a parent is a life changing event and many responsibilities 
come with it. Therefore, if we think that abortion is permissible and 
that a woman may wish to terminate her pregnancy in order to avoid 
these responsibilities, it is not unreasonable to think that she should be 
able to make an informed decision about what both options (either 
keeping or aborting the foetus) will involve. Therefore, knowing in 
advance whether or not the potential father would be involved will 
help to inform her decision. As a result, it seems reasonable to say that 
the man is under some obligation to inform her of his decision.  
 
3. Thomson’s Argument Applied 
In her paper “A Defense of Abortion” Thomson attempts to 
show that women should be allowed to have an abortion even if the 
foetus is a person.  She suggests that the foetus, even if it is a person, 
has no right to use the mother’s body against her will, and that it is 
entirely up to the mother whether or not she continues the pregnancy. 
She illustrates this idea with her violinist thought experiment. She 
writes “let me ask you to imagine this. You wake up in the morning 
and find yourself back to back in bed with an unconscious violinist. A 
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famous unconscious violinist. He has been found to have a fatal kidney 
ailment, and the Society of Music Lovers has canvassed all the 
available medical records and found that you alone have the right type 
of blood to help. They have therefore kidnapped you, and last night the 
violinist’s circulatory system was plugged into yours, so that your 
kidneys can be used to extract poisons from his blood as well as your 
own” (Thomson, 1971, pp. 48 - 49). She goes onto explain that in 
order to keep the violinist alive you must remain like that for nine 
months. Thomson suggests that in a case like this, it is permissible for 
you to unplug yourself and to let the violinist die. This has been seen 
as a powerful argument for the permissibility of abortion, because it 
attempts to show that a person’s right to control their own body and 
life means that they cannot be forced to give special assistance to 
others to keep them alive unless they willingly agree to it. 
However, what does this mean for men? The principle behind 
this defence is clear. We are not required to give people special 
assistance unless we agree to it. Now Thomson in this paper is 
primarily concerned with the bodily burdens placed on women during 
pregnancy. The assistance, so to speak, that they must give to their 
foetuses is bodily in nature and this, so Thomson argues, goes above 
and beyond what we are required to give to somebody unless we agree 
to it. However, I would ask what would make us think that only bodily 
burdens are above and beyond what we are required to give to 
somebody even if we do not agree to it? Surely, if we agree with 
Thomson’s argument, the reason we are not required to remain 
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attached to the violinist is because a burden of this nature is extremely 
high. This may be because it is bodily in nature, but it does not 
therefore follow that only bodily burdens are this demanding. It seems 
to me that eighteen years of unwilling financial payments are also 
extremely demanding, and thus are also above and beyond what can be 
demanded of us unless we agree. Undoubtedly, paying child support is 
a significant burden.3 This means that unless a putative father has 
agreed to this then we cannot force him to do it. As a result, if we think 
that this is a successful defence of abortion then it must also be a 
successful defence of elective abandonment.  
One way that somebody could attempt to forbid elective 
abandonment but to allow abortion would be to find some morally 
important distinction between them. The most obvious distinction 
between the two is that in the case of pregnancy the burden placed on 
women happens within the body, whereas, in the case of men after 
conception any burden occurs externally to the body. As a result, 
somebody could try to justify abortion by talking about the rights to 
                                                          
3 Someone might object here that for wealthy men the burden of child support is relatively 
minimal. As a result, this argument cannot be used for these men. I would point out that the 
same can be said of some women. For a woman with an active lifestyle, full time job etc. 
then the burden of an unwanted pregnancy might well be a heavy one. However, for some 
women the burden of pregnancy can be much lighter depending upon their physical health, 
financial situation and relationship status. As a result, if the wealth of the man makes a 
difference to the permissibility of elective abandonment then the health and lifestyle of the 
woman makes a difference to the permissibility of abortion.   
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bodily integrity and this justification might not apply to elective 
abandonment.      
In response, however, I would point out that whilst forcing a 
woman to remain pregnant might violate her rights to do what she 
wants with her body, forcing men to pay child support violates their 
rights to do what they want with their property, and perhaps also rights 
involving labour (and hence also their bodies) and their future. 
Undoubtedly, we do have rights to property, otherwise stealing would 
not be illegal and immoral. 
Somebody might respond by arguing that the burden of 
pregnancy, and thus the rights that are violated through being forced to 
continue it are more significant than the burden placed on men being 
forced to pay child support. David Boonin for example suggests that 
there is a difference between the sort of requirement placed on women 
and on men; he argues that with men they are “required only to hand 
over some money” (Boonin-Vail, 1997, p. 289) but in the case of 
women it is a direct physical burden. Boonin then pre-empts a 
potential response about how physical labour is also a significant 
burden. He writes "But surely it does not follow from the fact that one 
can choose to earn one's money doing painful physical labor and then 
be required to make a financial sacrifice for a given cause that one can 
also be required to do a comparable amount of painful physical labor 
on behalf of that cause" (Boonin-Vail, 1997, p. 289). 
Whilst I agree that there are some situations in which we can 
be made to make a financial sacrifice for a cause even though we 
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cannot be made to directly labour for that cause I believe that making 
unwilling biological fathers pay child support is not one of these 
situations (if we think that Thomson’s defence of abortion is 
successful). I will put forward three reasons for thinking this.  
The first is that I do not think that it is acceptable to demand 
that somebody make a financial sacrifice to a cause they do not wish to 
support, had no say in and from which they will gain nothing that they 
want in return.4 We cannot claim that engaging in sex involves 
agreeing to become a parent because, if it does, then this can also be 
said of women who agree to have sex and this undermines Thomson’s 
argument. As a result, we must accept that the man has not agreed to 
this state of affairs, has had no say in the matter and will gain nothing 
in return. This is distinct from things like paying taxes to your 
government because you have agreed to remain in the country, you 
receive public services in return and you have a say in how the 
government is run. This cannot be said of men who objected to 
fatherhood and who used contraception. This is because they did not 
agree to become or to remain fathers, they did not agree to pay child 
support and they probably had little say in how much they are being 
                                                          
4 One could argue that they will gain a potentially rewarding relationship with their child. 
This may well be true, but at least at this stage they do not want this (indeed they actively 
don’t want it!) and the same could be said of women and abortion.  Further, it seems 
worryingly contingent on certain facts about human psychology. Many men will find 
fatherhood rewarding but there may also be many who either get nothing from it or who 
find it actively emotionally unpleasant.   
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forced to pay and how it is spent. This means that there are significant 
differences between being forced to pay child support in the case of an 
accidental and unwilling father and paying taxes.5 As a result, 
Boonin’s analogy between things like taxation and the paying of child 
support seems misguided.           
A second problem with Boonin’s response is that the moral 
significance of a burden is measured by the amount of inconvenience, 
pain and distress caused; this can be said of being forced to hand over 
money. It will vary from man to man but so will the burden placed on 
women during pregnancy. Brake highlights that:  
“such payments might burden a man seriously physically, 
emotionally, and economically, depending on his occupation and 
earnings. Given that payments may be required for almost twenty 
years, that they might make it difficult for him to start a family or 
pursue other important plans, and that some occupations involve 
physical risk, the burdens of mandatory child support and of pregnancy 
might sometimes be comparable. It seems difficult to justify a general 
claim that the burdens of pregnancy are always greater than those of 
working overtime for eighteen years in a risky environment — or, for a 
chronically unemployed man under a system of stringent enforcement, 
                                                          
5 Further, the state and a foetus are very different entities and it does not follow that just 
because we can have responsibilities and obligations towards the state to pay taxes and so 
on (although some may even disagree with this) that we can therefore have responsibilities 
and obligations towards foetuses.  
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those of destitution, possible imprisonment, and mounting arrears” 
(Brake, 2005, p. 65). 
Brake raises a good point. If one of the reasons why abortion is 
permissible is because pregnancy can be a significant burden then it 
seems that elective abandonment must also be permissible because 
being forced to pay child support can be a significant burden for 
(some) men. On top of this, being made to pay child support is a 
significant restriction of a person’s freedom. A man’s options in terms 
of career, family, travel and life in general could be severely limited by 
forcing him to pay child support. If freedom is one of the motivating 
factors for allowing abortion then this suggests that we should allow a 
male equivalent to promote the same freedoms. As a result, I am not 
sure that any important distinction can be drawn between women and 
men. They both labour and have burdens when creating and raising a 
child and if abortion is permissible for women for this reason then so is 
a male counterpart.          
Finally, even if you think that there is a significant difference 
between pregnancy and childbirth on the part of the mother and paying 
child support on the part of the father and that they are fundamentally 
morally different sorts of things, Brake highlights that “Again, the fact 
that in the first case we are dealing with a putative right to the 
woman’s body (on the part of the fetus) and in the second with a 
putative right to the man’s money (on the part of the child) makes no 
difference, since the existence of a right should not depend on what the 
right in question is a right to” (Brake, 2005, p. 58). A person’s money 
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undoubtedly belongs to them and therefore the man has a right to his 
money in the same way that a woman has the right to her body. Thus, 
even if a significant distinction can be drawn between the burdens of 
labouring and giving money and the burdens of pregnancy, this does 
not change whether the foetus has a right to them. It may be that 
handing over money is a trifling affair, but this does nothing to show 
that the foetus therefore has a legitimate claim over it.6 This again 
means that if abortion is to be permissible for women then a male 
counterpart should also be permissible. These three responses to 
Boonin’s argument show that he fails to show that abortion is 
permissible but elective abandonment impermissible. 
I will now introduce my own thought experiment to show that 
it is not unreasonable in the case of accidental pregnancy to renounce 
any financial obligations to the unborn baby. You go to a magic show; 
the magician calls you up to the front and then hypnotises you. You 
are hypnotised into signing a form saying that you will pay money to 
another person for the next 18 years. The odds are that, even if you do 
not pay the money, the person will continue to survive and could still 
                                                          
6 Here I have focussed on the prospective father’s right to his money, property and labour, 
and on the financial burdens inherent in enforced child support. We could equally consider 
the emotional implications of enforced child support. These emotional burdens may well be 
equally, if not more, demanding than the financial burdens so the implications of these 
burdens should also be considered. Here, however, I focus primarily on the financial 
burdens since these are easier to identify and measure.   
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live a happy life. In this situation it does not seem that unreasonable to 
tear up the contract upon waking up from your hypnotised state.  
 Is there a morally significant difference between this and the 
violinist thought experiment? I am not sure that there is. In both cases 
you are put in an extremely difficult situation against your will, if you 
can remove yourself from one then why not the other? Further, to me, 
the hypnotist case seems much clearer than that of the violinist. I might 
have second thoughts about the violinist but not the hypnotist. After 
all, if I unplug myself from the violinist then somebody dies. Thus, 
because so much is at stake, I would feel the need to think things 
through very carefully. However, in the case of the hypnotist much 
less is at stake because no one will die if I tear up the contract. If the 
mother has no obligations to the foetus unless she agrees to them and 
thus an abortion is permissible even if the foetus is a person, then 
shouldn’t the father have the right to elective abandonment? If we 
agree with Thomson’s line of reasoning then it seems that a man 
cannot acquire parental responsibilities unless he willingly agrees to it.         
 
4. Warren’s Defence Applied 
I have applied Thomson’s defence of abortion to elective 
abandonment and now turn to Warren’s defence. Warren argues that it 
is the personhood of an adult or child that makes killing them wrong. 
However, she believes that abortion is permissible because foetuses 
are not people. She justifies her claim by arguing that in order to be a 
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person five traits are necessary: consciousness, reasoning, self-
motivated activity, the capacity to communicate and the presence of 
self-conception and awareness (Warren, 1973, p. 55). Warren argues 
that because foetuses do not have these five traits (certainly not in the 
early stages of pregnancy) they should not be considered persons. As a 
result, she argues that abortion is permissible.    
If we accept Warren’s defence of abortion then what does this 
mean for men? I believe that it would justify elective abandonment. 
This is because Warren is arguing that if foetuses are not persons then 
they do not, at this stage, have any inherent moral value and thus 
ending their lives is morally permissible. However, if something has 
no inherent moral value then there is nothing wrong with abandoning 
it, and if this is the case then elective abandonment is permissible. If a 
woman is allowed to end the life of a foetus because it is not a person, 
then surely a man is allowed to abandon it because it is not a person. If 
it is acceptable to end the life of a foetus then surely it is acceptable to 
abandon it.7  
Someone might respond to my argument by saying that a 
potential father cannot practice elective abandonment because it will in 
the future become his baby. He can ‘temporarily’ abandon it (whatever 
that means), but when it is born he will then have responsibilities 
towards it. However, if this is the case then this must mean that the 
                                                          
7 Indeed, one could potentially argue that abortion is simply an extreme form of 
abandonment.   
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future status of the foetus is able to prevent him from practising 
elective abandonment in the here and now (whilst it is still a foetus). If 
this is the case, then this must mean that the future status of the foetus 
is morally relevant in the here and now. This then gives it moral value 
and it is this that prevents the man from practicing elective 
abandonment. 
However, if the future status of the foetus is morally relevant in 
the here and now (whilst it is still a foetus) with regard to the man then 
it must also be morally relevant in the here and now with regard to the 
woman. This morally relevant future status of the foetus then gives the 
foetus moral value in the here and now (with regard to the woman) and 
this would then (at least pro tanto) mean that abortion is 
impermissible. If you cannot practice elective abandonment in the here 
and now because in the future the foetus will become a child, then by 
the same reasoning, surely you cannot permanently end its life in the 
here and now because it will in the future become a child. A thing 
either has moral value and is worthy of protection, or it does not. It 
would seem, to me, to be bizarre to believe that a foetus that is of no 
value to a woman has to be of binding value to men.   
Thus, if we want to accept Warren’s justification for abortion 
then we must accept that, at least during the early stages of pregnancy, 
the future life of the foetus is morally irrelevant. If this is the case, then 
the foetus is of no moral value to men in the present and therefore 
elective abandonment is permissible before a certain date. In the here 
and now then, a man could practice elective abandonment before the 
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foetus is born and thus avoid the status and responsibilities of 
fatherhood altogether. As a result, if we accept Warren’s defence of 
abortion then we have to allow for a male equivalent.     
Put another way, under Warren’s schema, abortion allows a 
woman to stop a particular set of parental obligations being realised 
when the child is born by terminating the pregnancy. She is allowed to 
do this, by terminating the pregnancy, because the foetus is not the sort 
of thing to which we can have obligations. Thus, killing the foetus is 
permissible. Therefore, all that the woman is doing, according to 
Warren, is stopping a particular set of parental obligations being 
realised. Elective abandonment would do the same thing. It stops the 
obligation from ever being realised. Indeed, it seems that the man’s 
way of stopping the obligation being realised is far less dramatic than 
the woman’s. He simply opts out whereas she has to completely cut off 
the foetus’s development and life. He simply cuts off one obligation 
from being realised whereas she is cutting off a whole life from being 
realised. It seems to me that if you are morally permitted to end the life 
of something then surely you are also morally permitted to abandon it. 
Therefore, if abortion is morally permissible then elective 
abandonment must also be morally permissible.   
Someone might object that the father, just after conception, has 
responsibilities to the future child and that these responsibilities can’t 
be severed. I would respond to this by arguing that if, just after 
conception, he has responsibilities to the future child then the mother 
must also have responsibilities to the future child and this must involve 
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not destroying its future (by terminating the pregnancy). Therefore, if 
abortion is permissible then the first way of conceptualising Warren’s 
argument (where the responsibilities do not exist until the child is 
born) must be correct and if this way of conceptualising Warren’s 
argument is correct then it also applies to elective abandonment.  
Another objection that could be raised is that there is 
potentially an important disanalogy between a woman having an 
abortion and elective abandonment. This potential disanalogy is that in 
the case of a woman having an abortion, if we accept that the foetus is 
not a person, there is no ‘victim’ i.e. nobody has suffered because of 
the woman’s decision. However, in the case of the man abandoning the 
foetus, there is a ‘victim’ in that there will be a child being raised 
without a father. However, this objection is subtly question begging. I 
have deliberately placed the word ‘victim’ in quotation marks to 
highlight this. No doubt not having a father is a bad thing and I am by 
no means belittling the important role that most fathers play in their 
children’s lives. However, it does not necessarily follow that just 
because something bad may happen to somebody that someone else in 
particular is obliged to recompense them. Indeed, the very word 
recompense implies that an overt wrong has been committed and that 
compensation is needed. However, whether a wrong is committed in 
the case of elective abandonment is precisely the question we are 
interested in; is it always wrong for an unwilling father to abandon his 
unborn foetus? My answer to this question is that if we think that 
Warren’s and Thomson’s defences of abortion are successful then it is 
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not necessarily wrong for an unwilling father under certain 
circumstances to abandon his unborn foetus. I have spelled out a way 
of conceptualising and applying Warren’s and Thomson’s argument to 
elective abandonment so that we can see why this is the case. As a 
result, somebody who holds up the objection of the child being a 
‘victim’ without explaining why Warren’s and Thomson’s defences of 
abortion cannot also be applied to elective abandonment in the way 
that I have outlined is assuming that the father has done something 
wrong. However, this is precisely the question that we are interested 
in. Thus, if someone wants to criticise elective abandonment then they 
must explain why Thomson’s and Warren’s defences of abortion 
cannot be applied to elective abandonment. Simply pointing out that 
there are, obviously, some disanalogies is not enough.  
Someone might try to develop this objection by arguing that 
abortion is permissible because you are permitted to kill a foetus. 
However, with regard to elective abandonment the father would be 
abandoning more than the foetus, because the child would then be 
being raised without a father, and abandoning your children is 
impermissible. My response to this is to point out that when the man 
practices elective abandonment he is only abandoning the foetus and 
not the child. He then simply has no obligations to the child. It may 
well be bad for children to be raised without their fathers. However, 
again it does not follow that the biological father who has carried out 
elective abandonment is therefore obliged to recompense the child 
unless we’ve already decided that elective abandonment is 
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impermissible. However, this is precisely what we are trying to 
ascertain and thus assuming this is question begging.  
This way of conceptualising Warren’s defence of abortion 
when applied to a male equivalent also explains why a father who has 
raised his children for some time cannot then abandon them. They are 
now morally valuable. He did not absent himself when they did not 
have any moral value and so he now has responsibilities and 
obligations towards them. He is now, in every sense of the word, a 
father with all the obligations that come with that. This is exactly the 
same as a mother. A mother cannot kill her children because they now 
have moral value, if she had wanted an abortion she should have done 
that when they lacked moral value. They are now morally valuable and 
thus she has responsibilities and obligations towards them.8, 9      
                                                          
8 It should be noted that I am oversimplifying in this paragraph. In reality there are a large 
number of different theories about the value of new-borns in the same way that there are 
different views about the value of foetuses. Similarly, most of the views which believe that 
foetuses do not have moral value, but that adult humans and children do would not claim 
that a foetus all of a sudden gains value the moment it is born. Instead they would argue 
that the value of the foetus and new-born baby grows as he or she develops. However, my 
general point still stands. If we think that foetuses do not have moral value (but that adults 
do) then gradually the number of duties we have towards the new-born baby, toddler and 
child will grow and increase as they develop and their moral value increases. As time 
progresses killing or abandoning them will become steadily more and more impermissible.         
9 Indeed, it could possibly be argued that there is something of a female equivalent to 
elective abandonment already in place. Women can choose to carry the child to term, refuse 
to tell the father, and then give it up for adoption. We might argue that this is not too 
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Another way of developing this sort of objection further would 
be to argue that there is a moral difference between a foetus-to-be-born 
and a foetus-to-be-aborted. Someone might argue that a foetus-to-be-
born has rights and interests that a foetus-to-be-aborted does not. Thus, 
it is impermissible to abandon a foetus-to-be-born in a way that it is 
not with a foetus-to-be-aborted and thus elective abandonment is 
impermissible (when the mother intends to continue the pregnancy).10 
Does it follow from this that abortion would be permissible but 
elective abandonment impermissible?   
 It seems to me this would not follow for the simple reason that 
once again we can set up an analogue in the case of elective 
abandonment. In the same way that this criticism distinguishes 
between a foetus-to-be-born and a foetus-to-be-aborted we can 
distinguish between a foetus-to-be-born-with-a-father and a foetus-to-
be-born-without-a-father. Children who are raised without fathers are, 
                                                                                                                                                   
dissimilar to elective abandonment in that she surrenders all parental responsibilities and 
rights to the child. From a practical perspective there is nothing the father can do to prevent 
this because he is unaware of the situation, and as a result the decision is entirely her own. 
This option is unavailable to men, because they cannot give the child up for adoption if the 
mother wants to keep it, and yet they will still be liable for child support. This observation 
should strengthen the plausibility of the permissibility of elective abandonment. The 
disparity in freedom is now, arguably, doubled.  
10 Instinctively I have issues with this sort of approach as it would mean that two near 
identical foetuses have a different moral status simply because of the attitude that other 
agents take towards them. This would strike me as extremely odd and unlikely. However, 
for the sake of argument let’s accept that this is possible. 
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in our society at least, often disadvantaged in comparison with children 
who are raised with fathers. However, it does not follow that children 
who are raised without fathers are therefore ‘wronged’ because of this. 
A child whose father dies is not ‘wronged’ by his father even though 
he may well be disadvantaged because of this. This is because such a 
child no longer has a father to wrong him. As a result, it seems to me 
we can still reasonably ask whether or not a child whose father 
practices elective abandonment is necessarily wronged by him doing 
this even though he may well be disadvantaged because of this.  
 Put another way, we can simply say that in the same way that 
the moral status of a foetus-to-be-born is different to the moral status 
of a foetus-to-be-aborted we can argue that the moral status of a 
foetus-to-be-born-with-a-father is different to the moral status of a 
foetus-to-be-born-without-a-father. One of the differences, so we could 
say, between the moral status of a foetus-to-be-born-without-a-father 
and the moral status of a foetus-to-be-born-with-a-father is that the 
former is not wronged by the present and future absence of his father 
whereas the latter potentially is (although it should be noted that 
whether or not this actually is the case under all circumstances is 
another question and is beyond the scope of this paper). The fact that 
foetus-to-be-born-without-a-father is disadvantaged by this status does 
nothing to show that his father has wronged him by practicing elective 
abandonment and thus it may still be perfectly permissible.  
Therefore, we can respond by saying that in the same way that 
a foetus-to-be-born has certain rights and interests that a foetus-to-be-
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aborted does not so a foetus-to-be-born-with-a-father has certain rights 
and interests that a foetus-to-be-born-without-a-father does not. What 
decides whether a foetus is a foetus-to-be-born or a foetus-to-be-
aborted is the wishes and intentions of the mother and what decides 
whether a foetus is a foetus-to-be-born-with-a-father or a foetus-to-be-
born-without-a-father is the wishes and intentions of the father. It 
would seem to me to be very odd that the intentions and wishes of the 
mother alone can change the moral status of a foetus but that a father’s 
intentions and wishes cannot change the foetus’s moral status in any 
way.   
There is a further question about what the man’s obligations 
are if a woman becomes pregnant and refuses to tell him until after the 
child is born and thus has moral value. The window of time, so to 
speak, in which the foetus lacked value has now closed. For the 
purposes of this paper I am assuming perfect knowledge for all 
involved, so everybody would know what was going on. In the real 
world in order to work out what his obligations are in situations like 
this perhaps the best thing would be to try to work out what decision 
the man would have made and to hold him to that. This, of course, 
would be tricky to do but this is often the case with real world ethics.   
A final objection that someone might raise would be to argue 
that the father owes support to the mother rather than to the child. I 
think this sort of objection is unlikely to work for two reasons. The 
first is that normally child support is conceived of as being owed to the 
child rather than the parent. As a result, this sort of objection would 
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involve radically rethinking our conception of child support. The 
second reason is that potentially this objection risks opening up 
questions around the permissibility of abortion when the father 
strongly objects. Depending upon how this objection is developed, it 
potentially risks implying that somehow through the act of conception 
a man and woman owe each other special support. Therefore, the man 
is obliged to financially support the woman. However, if he owes her 
special support through the act of conception then surely she owes him 
special support through the act of conception. Terminating a man’s 
unborn child without his consent might potentially cause him a great 
deal of distress and so perhaps she owes it to him to continue the 
pregnancy if terminating it would cause him distress. As a result, if 
someone wants to raise this objection then they will either need to 
accept that a woman can potentially wrong a man by terminating a 
pregnancy if the death of his unborn child causes him distress or they 
will need to carefully sketch out how the act of sex and/or conception 
generates responsibilities to the other person in such a way as to avoid 
this conclusion. I suspect that doing this will be extremely difficult and 
as such I will leave it to my opponents.      
 
5. Conclusion  
  I have now sketched out two of the most influential arguments 
for abortion and have applied them to a male counterpart called 
elective abandonment. I have shown that both arguments apply equally 
well to both elective abandonment and abortion. It therefore follows 
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that if the arguments are successful then both abortion and elective 
abandonment are morally permissible. More generally I think that this 
paper has numerous implications for contemporary philosophy and 
society more generally. For example, this highlights that the 
implications for men of the literature on abortion have largely been 
ignored. This paper has gone some way towards rectifying this but a 
more detailed discussion is needed.  
Another implication is that in countries where abortion is legal 
there is potentially an important and unjust disparity in freedom 
between men and women. The legal implications of this need to be 
considered. Should elective abandonment be legally adopted in some 
manner then a variety of other important questions will need to be 
answered. One such question is whether the fact that later abortions 
have higher risks to the life and health of the woman than earlier 
abortions has any impact on the potential time limit for elective 
abandonment. It could reasonably be argued that the time limit for 
elective abandonment should be much earlier than that of abortion 
because the prospective mother will need to be informed of the 
prospective father’s decision in order to make an informed choice 
about whether or not to proceed with the pregnancy. If the prospective 
father delays making a decision, then this increases the risks to the 
mother should she choose to abort later on as a result of his decision. 
As a result, perhaps an earlier time limit for elective abandonment is 
needed than for abortion. How much earlier this should be, however, 
remains to be seen. Further, as mentioned earlier we will need to 
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consider what happens when a prospective mother refuses to tell a 
prospective father. I have already offered a tentative solution earlier in 
this paper, but more research is probably needed. For now, however, I 
conclude that both Warren’s and Thomson’s defences of abortion 
apply equally well to elective abandonment, and that if abortion is 
morally permissible then so is elective abandonment.     
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